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I. Introduction 
 A small child enters a courtroom to face the people that have subjected her to sexual and 
physical abuse.  As she takes a seat she steals a glance at her abusers. She cannot help but look, 
for her abusers are her parents.  She turns her head to hide her tears, and also, the stove coil-
shaped burn marks that have been branded upon her face.  Should the public and the media be 
permitted to enter the courtroom to capture this heart-wrenching scene? Or should the 
proceeding be cloaked in confidentiality?  The answer depends on the state in which the 
proceeding is being held.1 In recent years a debate has been raging among scholars and 
practitioners as to whether states should adopt a presumption of open access or confidentiality in 
juvenile dependency courts.2 The policy adopted by a particular state has a distinct impact on its 
dependency proceedings.3 Whether the impact is positive or negative is at the very core of the 
debate.  Allowing the public access to dependency court hearings removes the cloak of 
confidentiality but at what cost to the child?  
 
1 Barbara White Stack, The Trend Toward Opening Juvenile Court is Now Gaining Momentum,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1.  Rules governing access to juvenile proceedings 
vary by state.  Id.  For example, California’s juvenile dependency proceedings are presumed 
closed while Oregon’s proceedings are presumed open.  Id.  
2 Id.
3 Lynne Tucker, Open or Closed: A survey of the opinions and the realities of opening Juvenile 
Court dependency proceedings, Nov. 2000, 
http://www.childwelfare.net/activities/interns/2000summer/OpenCourts/.   If proceedings are 
open, the media and community members have access to viewing the difficult and often 
traumatic issues dealt with in dependency courtrooms.  It has been noted that opening 
proceedings to the public did not disrupt the flow of the court system as many had feared.  Id. at 
1.  A Michigan judge worried that if the system was opened, “the sky would fall” but noted that 
once it was opened “it didn’t.” Id.  Witness of open proceedings in Minnesota noted that 
members of the public are only “interested in high-profile cases.”  Id.  
2Too often, in scholarly debates over the most efficient court procedures, the focus is 
taken off of those for whom dependency proceedings were created.4 The children and their 
needs are too easily forgotten.  When developing court access procedures is important to bear in 
mind the tragic circumstances that bring children into dependency courtrooms.  As former foster 
child and current lawyer Andrew Bridge said, “[w]e ought to remember what we asked of the 
children along the way: we expected them to endure unfathomable loneliness, possess courage 
few of us have, and in the end, outlast every assault a heart can take.”5
The purpose of this comment is to take an in-depth look at each side of the debate; 
analyzing states that have open court proceedings in juxtaposition with those that have 
proceedings that are presumed closed.  Part II discusses the structure and history of dependency 
courts.6 Part III sets out the limited federal law in this area.7 Part IV analyzes different state 
approaches to juvenile court access.8 Part V describes the impact of court access rules on the 
area of juvenile law 9 and Part VI concludes the comment.10 
II. The Dependency Court System 
 Before undertaking an analysis of the preferred system of access to juvenile dependency 
courts, it is important to discuss what transpires within dependency courtrooms.  Dependency 
 
4 See Id.  
5 Andrew Bridge, Address at the 2001 Adoption Day in Los Angeles County (July 28, 2001), 
available at http://www.courtkids.org/adoption/index.html.   
 
6 See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. 
 
7 See infra notes 20-46 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 47-232 and accompanying text. 
 
9 See infra notes 232-83 and accompanying text. 
 
10 See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text. 
3proceedings are those involving children under eighteen years of age who have been the subject 
of physical or sexual abuse, neglect, or abandonment.11 In dependency cases, it is the child’s 
parent or guardian that has allegedly committed the acts of abuse or neglect.12 To initiate a 
dependency proceeding, a petition is filed by the local child welfare department against at least 
one parent or guardian and the child becomes a dependent of the court.13 
The specific manner in which dependency proceedings are conducted depends largely on 
state laws and run the gamut from hearings held in a designated courtroom within the main 
courthouse to an entirely separate court dedicated solely to dependency cases.14 Los Angeles 
County was the first in the nation to develop a separate, “child-sensitive” courthouse to hear 
dependency matters.15 The courthouse in Los Angeles is a recent development in the history of 
juvenile dependency courts.   
 
11 L. Ernestine Fields, What is Dependency Court?, COMFORT FOR COURT KIDS, INC., 
http://www.courtkids.org/whatisdependcourt.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).  Dependency court 
proceedings are distinctly different from juvenile offender proceedings.  In dependency court, the 
child is the victim, not the offender.  The terms “juvenile court” and “children’s court” are often 
used to describe both dependency and delinquency hearings.  Id. 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  Petitions are filed by the local child welfare department and describe the alleged abuse or 
neglect and the particular state statute that the parent or guardian is accused of violating.  
Pending the disposition of the petition, the child may or may not be removed from the parent or 
guardian’s home depending on the nature and severity of the situation.  See Los Angeles County 
Department of Children and Family Services, Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
http://dcfs.co.la.ca.us/faq.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).   
 
14 See Los Angeles Almanac, http://www.laalmanac.com/crime/cr57.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 
2006).   
 
15 Id. Edmund D. Edelman Children’s Court was opened in Monterey Park, California in 1992.  
The facility features courtrooms designed on a more child-friendly scale, colorful murals, and 
play areas.  Id. In an attempt to further minimize the trauma associated with attending a court 
hearing, teddy bears are given to each child each time they attend a hearing in the courthouse.  L. 
Ernestine Fields, COMFORT FOR COURT KIDS, INC., http://www.courtkids.org/mission.html (last 
4The first juvenile court in the United States was created in Illinois in 1899 and grouped 
delinquent and dependent children together.16 The Illinois state statute that created the court 
mandated that a special courtroom be designated for juvenile proceedings.17 This provision was 
understood as a type of confidentiality requirement and other states followed suit creating 
juvenile courts with confidentiality rules.18 Today, juvenile dependency hearings may be open 
or closed depending on the state in which the case is being heard.19 
III. Federal Law and Juvenile Dependency Courts 
 Dependency law is largely a creature of state statute.20 However, certain federal acts 
such as the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act21 and the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act22 set out rules that affect the way that matters are conducted in dependency courts.  
These acts and their effect on confidentiality in dependency proceedings will be analyzed in turn. 
 
visited Jan. 4, 2006).  The teddy bears are used as a source of comfort for the children and also 
by court officers to aid the child in testifying.  Id.   
 
16 Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1, 30 (2001).  
 
17 Id. at 31.  The decision to create a separate courtroom in the first juvenile court reflected the 
belief that “confidentiality was critical to rehabilitation and treatment.  Only if children escaped 
the stigma of public knowledge, the juvenile court founders reasoned, could they leave behind 
their troubled pasts.”  Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should 
the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155 (1999).  
 
18 Id. “By 1939, a substantial number of states had some confidentiality provisions concerning 
their juvenile courts.”  Id. at 32.   
 
19 Stack, supra note 1, at A1. 
 
20 Tucker, supra note 3. “The laws governing court confidentiality within the child abuse and 
neglect system are almost exclusively governed by state statutes.”  Id.  
21 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2003).   
 
22 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2003).  
5A. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) was enacted in 1974.23 The 
Act was born out of concern of a child abuse epidemic in the United States and fueled by a 
Congressional finding that approximately 900,000 children in America are victims of abuse and 
neglect each year.24 CAPTA provided for the establishment of an Office on Child Abuse and 
Neglect to oversee and carry out the functions of the Act.25 In addition, the Act mandated the 
establishment of an advisory board to make recommendations to lawmakers concerning child 
abuse and neglect issues26 and a national clearinghouse for information relating to child abuse.27 
States may apply for grant monies under CAPTA to be used to fund child abuse 
prevention and treatment programs and to train volunteers and employees of such programs.28 In 
order to receive such funds from the federal government, CAPTA requires that the state make a 
showing that they maintain complete record confidentiality “in order to protect the rights of the 
child and of the child’s parents or guardians.”29 From this language it is apparent that the 
 
23 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2003).  The Act has been amended six times since its enactment, most 
recently in 2003.  Id.   
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (2003). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 5104 (2003).  The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Information that was mandated by CAPTA can now be accessed by the public on the internet.  
National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect Information, Gateways to Information: 
Protecting Children and Strengthening Families, http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov (last visited Jan. 16, 
2006).  
 
28 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2003). 
 
29 Id. Under this provision, records shall only be made available to: persons in the report; child 
abuse citizen review panels; child fatality review panels; government agencies which need such 
6drafters of the Act were concerned with possible harmful effects on the child if information 
contained in his or her court records were to be made public.  
Though CAPTA makes a clear requirement of record confidentiality, it was not always so 
clear on the issue of public access to juvenile proceedings.30 Before the 2003 amendments were 
in place, the Act was silent on the issue of the confidentiality of court proceedings.31 This 
statutory silence allowed states to “continue receiving federal funding while conducting open 
hearings.”32 In 2003, the statutory silence was shattered by an amendment that made it clear that 
it is up to the states to determine whether the public should be allowed access to child abuse and 
neglect proceedings.33 The Act now states that “[n]othing in subparagraph (A) shall be 
construed to limit the State’s flexibility to determine State policies relating to public access to 
court proceedings to determine child abuse and neglect, except that such policies shall, at a 
minimum, ensure the safety and well-being of the child, parents, and families.”34 Though the 
ball is placed firmly in the state’s court to decide whether proceedings should be open or closed, 
 
information to carry out their duty to protect children from abuse and neglect; grand jury or court 
upon a finding that the information is needed to determine an issue before the court; other 
individuals or entities authorized by state statute to receive the information pursuant to a 
legitimate state purpose.  Id. This record confidentiality provision illustrates the federal position 
that only those immediately concerned with the protection of children from abuse should be 
given access to the records of such cases.   
 
30 Tucker, supra note 3. 
 
31 Id.  
 
32 Id.  
 
33 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2003). 
 
34 Id. The quoted portion of the statute refers to subsection (A) which outlines the requirements 
that a state must meet in order to receive funds under the Act.  Id.  
 
7the drafters included specific language to emphasize that the well-being of the child and his or 
her family should be of paramount importance.  
B. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) is another federal act which 
places some restriction on the confidentiality of child abuse and neglect issues.35 AACWA was 
enacted in 1980 with the goal of providing sufficient resources to the foster care system and 
ensuring that children did not languish for years in the system without a permanent plan or 
placement.36 The Act emphasizes family preservation and reunification and requires that the 
state make “reasonable efforts” to reunify children with their families when possible or to move 
them to permanent adoptive homes.37 The Act also provides for state funding if the state 
develops a plan for foster care and adoption assistance in accordance with the guidelines set out 
in the Act.38 
In order to receive funding under the Act, the state must put into place safeguards “which 
restrict the use of or disclosure of information concerning individuals assisted under the State 
plan.”39 This confidentiality safeguard ensures that information about children and families 
 
35 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2003). 
 
36 MaryLee Allen & Mary Bissell, Safety and Stability for Foster Children: The Policy Context,
14 CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND FOSTER CARE 1, 50 (2004), available at 
http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/vol_14_no_1_no_photos.pdf.  
 
37 Id. Following the enactment of AACWA, the term “reasonable efforts” was the source of much 
confusion as some took it to mean that a child must remain in his or her home even if the 
situation was far from ideal.  Id. at 53-54.  In 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act was 
passed which clarified the term “reasonable efforts” emphasizing that “nothing in federal law 
requires a child to remain in or be returned to an unsafe home.”  Id. at 53. 
 
38 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2003).  
 
39 Id.  
8served by the Act is not disseminated to the general public.40 The information may only be 
released for purposes directly connected with the administration of the state’s foster care plan, 
for purposes of criminal investigations, and as part of investigations of reported child abuse.41 
This confidentiality provision is another example of the drafters of a federal act taking care to put 
the safety and well-being of the child at the forefront.42 By restricting the release of information, 
the Act ensures that states do not place the identities and personal information of children before 
the public eye.43 If a state wishes to forego these requirements they risk losing their federal 
funding for foster care programs due to non-compliance with the Act.44 
Furthermore, though this Act does not specifically mention whether the proceedings 
themselves may be made public, the confidentiality provision provides some insight into the 
drafter’s intent.45 Because confidential identifying information about the child and his or her 
family is read at abuse and neglect proceedings, it follows that the public should not be present to 
hear such information.  It seems contradictory to adhere to a requirement of record 
confidentiality yet allow the public access to the courtroom during dependency proceedings.  
Because both the AACWA and CAPTA do not specifically prohibit open court proceedings, 
 
40 Id.  
41 Id. The Act explicitly notes that states are free to create more restrictive confidentiality 
requirements and “in the case of adoptions, prevent disclosure entirely.”  Id.   
 
42 See id.  
 
43 Id.  
 
44 Tucker, supra note 3. “It is not likely that any state would find it financially feasible to 
relinquish their federal funding as these monies usually comprise a substantial part of the state’s 
operating budget for the child welfare system.”  Id.  
 
45 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2003). 
9states have been able to open the doors of their dependency courtrooms yet continue to receive 
federal funding under these acts.46 
IV. State Approaches to Juvenile Dependency Court Access 
 Because federal law does not specifically address the issue of access to dependency court 
proceedings, states have been free to develop their own systems.47 Analyzing several of the 
diverse state approaches will provide a framework from which to analyze which system provides 
the most protection for abused and neglected children.48 
A. Let the Sunshine In: States with Open Court Provisions 
1. Florida 
 For members of the public seeking access to dependency court proceedings, Florida truly 
is the Sunshine State.49 In Florida, juvenile dependency proceedings, except those to terminate 
custody, are presumed open to the public.50 The section that follows will analyze the 
development of Florida’s open court policy and its impact on the state and its children. 
a. Here Comes the Sun: The Florida Open Court Policy  
 
46 Id.  
 
47 Tucker, supra note 3.  
 
48 Protection of abused and neglected children will be the central focus of such analysis.  The 
federal acts described above make it clear that the health, safety, and emotional well-being of the 
child is paramount and should be taken into account by states when developing specific policies 
and procedures governing child abuse and neglect proceedings.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 23-46.  
 
49 Florida is one of twelve states with open proceedings.  See Barbara White Stack, States That 
Have Open or Closed Hearings, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1.  The other states 
with presumptively open proceedings are: Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas.  Id. This article will 
discuss Florida and Oregon as representative examples of open court systems.  See infra notes 
49-155 and accompanying text.  
 
50 Stack, supra note 1, at A1. 
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Prior to a 1994 statutory amendment, Florida court hearings on the matters of unwed 
mothers, sexual abuse, and child custody were confidential and closed to the public.51 However, 
legislators moved to remove the dependency system’s veil of confidentiality and drafted an 
amendment which shifted Florida’s policy to a presumption of openness.52 The revised statute 
dictates: 
 [a]ll hearings . . . shall be open to the public, and a person may not be excluded 
except on special order of the judge, who may close any hearing to the public 
upon determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served 
by so doing.53 
Though this amendment gives the public, including the media, much broader access to 
dependency proceedings, access is not absolute.  It is important to note that the judge retains the 
discretion to close proceedings after a finding that it is in the best interest of the child or the 
public to deny public access.54 Because the statute does not set out specific factors for judges to 
 
51 1994 Fla. Laws 164.  Among the material deleted from the older version of the statute was the 
rule that “[a]ll hearings involving unwed mothers, custody, sexual abuse, or permanent 
placement of children shall remain confidential and closed to the public.”  Id. For other 
categories of hearings, it was within the judge’s discretion whether to close it to the public. 
 
52 FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). 
 
53 Id.  
 
54 Id. The 1994 amendment to this statute changed the language to emphasize that the judge must 
make a determination that the welfare of the child or public interest would be served by closing 
the proceeding.  1994 Fla. Laws 164.  The inclusion of such language implies that the judge must 
make a particularized finding based on the facts of the case instead of basing the decision to 
close the proceedings on her own desire or opinion.  This language likely was included to 
address the concern that judges may disagree with the open policy and close their proceedings at 
will.  Requiring the judge to make a separate, on the record, determination takes some of the 
control out of the hands of the individual judge and makes the determination dependent on the 
facts of the case.   
 
11
weigh in determining exactly when it would be in the best interest of the public or child to close 
the proceeding, some judicial discretion is permitted.55 
In certain Florida cases, the public sun shall not shine at all.  An exception to the 
presumption of openness is carved out by another section of the Florida statutes.56 The statute 
declares that “[a]ll hearings involving termination of parental rights are confidential and closed 
to the public.”57 This statute does not provide for any judicial discretion or opportunity to open 
such hearings to the public.58 The language is absolute and unwavering; hearings terminating 
parental rights are closed to the public.59 Why has Florida decided to treat such hearings 
differently from other dependency proceedings? The answer to this question can best be 
explained by looking at a case that challenged this disparate classification.   
In Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services,60 
parents who were the subject of a dependency petition claimed that the Florida statute requiring 
 
55 FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). Because no such guidelines are given to judges in the statute, 
a case by case determination is necessary to protect the welfare of the child and the best interest 
of the public.  Some situations may cry out for court closure because of their severity and the 
potential impact of public access on the child, while others may be more suited to public 
observation.   
 
56 See FLA. STAT. § 39.809(4) (2005).   
 
57 Id.  
 
58 Id.  
 
59 Id.  
 
60 780 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 2001). The parents in this case initially moved to close all proceedings 
and to prevent any information about the case from being released.  Id. at 7.  They argued that it 
was “against the child’s best interests to be exposed to the press and media.”  Id.  At a later point, 
for reasons unreported, the parents reversed their position and began to argue that the statute 
closing TPR proceedings was unconstitutional.  Id. at 8.  
 
12
termination of parental rights (TPR) hearings to be closed was unconstitutional.61 In affirming 
the validity of the statute, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the goal of a TPR hearing is to 
ensure the health and safety of the child and is not designed to punish parents.62 The court 
emphasized that the interest in protecting the child takes precedence over any interest the state 
may have in punishing the parents.63 Because TPR hearings may lead to the dissolution of the 
parent-child relationship, the mental state of the child may be especially delicate and in need of 
further protection.64 
Another restriction on access in Florida can be seen in the state’s records laws.  By 
statute, all court records required to be kept for proceedings relating to children “shall not be 
open to inspection by the public.”65 The records may only be inspected upon an order of the 
court and only by “persons deemed by the court to have a proper interest” in the records.66 The 
child, his parents, attorneys, and other similar parties to the case may always inspect and copy 
any record pertaining to the child.67 The restriction on public access to case records serves as a 
protective barrier between the public and the child. While the public and the news media may be 
 
61 Id.  
 
62 Id. at 11.  
 
63 Id. 
64 While the court does not elaborate on the nature of TPR hearings, one does not have to stretch 
very far to imagine the difficult issues faced by families in such hearings.  Because TPR hearings 
dissolve “the legal ties between parent and child” they are informally referred to as the “death 
sentence” in Florida dependency courts.  Amy Bennett Williams, Shining Light on Child-court 
Cases: Campaigns to Make Kids’ Plight Public, NEWS-PRESS (FLA.), Jan. 8, 2006.  
 
65 FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2005).   
 
66 Id.  
 
67 Id. 
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entitled to attend certain dependency court proceedings,68 this records provision ensures that they 
will not be able to scour the documents related to each case.69 
In addition to hearings to terminate parental rights, adoption hearings under the Florida 
Adoption Act are to be closed to the public.70 The statute requires that all adoptions hearings 
under the Act “shall be held in closed court without admittance of any person other than essential 
officers of the court, the parties, witnesses, counsel, persons who have not consented to the 
adoption and are required to consent, and representatives of the agencies who are present to 
perform their official duties.”71 Not only are the doors of these hearings closed to the public and 
to the media, the records of these hearings are similarly sealed.72 An order of the court is 
necessary to inspect adoption records and birth certificates.73 If the court denies an adoption 
petition, the statute does allow the petitioner to make public the reasons why the petition was 
denied.74 This statute is another exception to Florida’s open court policy and, like the statute 
closing TPR hearings, was the subject of litigation. 
 
68 FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). 
 
69 FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2005). Children come into the dependency court system because 
they are victims of some type of abuse or neglect.  It follows then that the records of their cases 
contain intimate details of their lives.  
 
70 FLA. STAT. § 63.162(1) (2005).   
 
71 Id. This statute closes courtroom doors to the public during adoption hearings and limits access 
to those directly involved with the adoption. 
 
72 FLA. STAT. § 63.162(2) (2005).   
 
73 Id.  
 
74 Id.
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In one case, a bitter custody battle ensued between the maternal and paternal 
grandparents of an orphaned girl.75 The case, which had been covered extensively by the media, 
initially resulted in an adoption order in favor of the paternal grandparents.76 However, because 
the child was unrepresented by counsel in earlier proceedings, the adoption order was set aside 
and an attorney ad litem appointed for the child for future hearings.77 The child’s attorney 
moved to close the proceedings and the trial court denied the motion holding that Florida Statute 
section 63.162(1) was unconstitutionally overbroad.78 The case was eventually heard by the 
Florida Supreme Court which reversed the trial court and found the statute to be constitutional.79 
In reaching this decision, the court explained why the Florida legislature has treated adoption 
proceedings differently from other types of cases.80 The court noted that in typical litigation, the 
court is a disinterested observer, given the task of resolving competing interests of the parties.81 
75 In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 1984). 
 
76 Id. Per Florida’s open court law, the media and public had been allowed access to the initial 
dependency court proceedings. See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). 
 
77 In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d at 1128. 
 
78 Id. When the child’s attorney moved to close the proceedings, the media protested claiming 
that “the policy underlying the statute was inapplicable to the facts of this case and that any right 
of privacy the child might claim had been waived.”  Id.  The trial court sided with the media but 
reasoned its decision on constitutional grounds.  Id.  It held the statute closing adoption 
proceedings overbroad because it did not allow for discretion in its application.  Id. The trial 
court declared that the media had a First Amendment right to access and should not be barred 
from the courtroom unless the constitutional right to a fair trial outweighed the media right to 
access.  Id.  The child’s attorney appealed the decision and the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
certified the issue to be of great public importance and passed it directly on to the Florida 
Supreme Court.  Id.   
79 Id.  
 
80 Id. 
81 Id.  
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In adoption cases, the court is not disinterested as it is charged with serving the best interests of 
the child.82 This difference in court function and the statutes developed to handle adoption 
proceedings reflect “an overriding public policy of protecting from harmful publicity parties to 
and the subject to adoption proceedings.”83 In reaffirming the protectionist policy, the court 
drew a careful distinction between public interest and true public concern.84 The court noted that 
public interest refers to issues that generate wide reader curiosity and satisfy the reader or 
viewer’s desire for fascinating, or even scandalous, bits of information.85 Matters of public 
interest may generate customers for the news media, but they are not equivalent to matters of 
true public concern.  The court held that the Florida statute, as applied in this case, had the effect 
of minimally impairing the media’s access to a story of public interest, but had no effect on its 
freedom to cover a matter of actual public concern.86 The court ordered all proceedings to be 
conducted in compliance with the Florida statute.87 According to this decision, a slight 
impairment of the media’s ability to tell the next salacious story does not rise to the level of 
constitutional concern.  
 
82 Id. 
83 Id. The parties to the adoption and the news media argued that any harm to be done to the 
child through media exposure had already been done by the coverage of the earlier proceedings.  
Id. at 1129.  This is an interesting argument to say the least.  In essence they attempt to justify 
further intrusion into the child’s life by the fact that the intimate details of the case had already 
been exposed.  It can be strongly argued that it is never too late to step in and try to protect a 
child from further exposure and the harm that may result from continued media coverage.   
 
84 Id. 
85 In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d at 1128 (citing Firestone v. Time, 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 
1972)).   
 
86 Id.  
 
87 Id.   
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b. Are Florida Children Getting Sunburned?  
The amount of Florida sunshine that is shed on a dependency proceeding depends largely 
on the nature of the case.88 As we have seen, adoption proceedings, TPR hearings, and court 
records are presumptively closed to the public.89 With these expansive exceptions to the rule, 
Florida’s open court policy now resembles something close to legislative Swiss cheese.  Florida 
legislators have declared it necessary to protect the children from the public eye when they are 
being adopted and when their parents lose their rights to them.90 They have also determined that 
it is important to shield the children’s records from the outside world.91 It is clear from the 
exceptions carved into the rule that Florida lawmakers want to protect children.  Why then, must 
the pain on the children’s faces be open for viewing? 
The Florida Supreme Court even presents a compelling argument for closed juvenile 
dependency proceedings.92 In Natural Parents of J.B., the court devotes much of its opinion to 
discussing closed court policies.93 The court says, “we do not agree that the presumption of 
openness in criminal proceedings is or should be extended to juvenile proceedings. The 
foundation of the juvenile system is to ‘preserve and promote the welfare of the child,’ which 
makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial.”94 The court 
 
88 See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.0132(3), 39.507(2), 39.809(4), 63.162(1) (2005).  
 
89 FLA. STAT. §§ 39.0132(3), 39.809(4), 63.162(1) (2005). 
 
90 FLA. STAT. §§ 39.809(4), 63.162(1) (2005). 
 
91 FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2005). 
92 Natural Parents of J.B., 780 So. 2d at 9.  
 
93 Id.  
 
94 Natural Parents of J.B., 780 So. 2d at 9 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984)).  
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applies this analysis to justify closing TPR hearings, but the language used can also be used to 
support closing all juvenile dependency proceedings.  The court strengthens its argument by 
pointing to history declaring that “[i]t is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United 
States that virtually from its inception at the end of last century its proceedings have been 
conducted outside of the public’s full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts 
have been shielded from publicity.”95 
The court’s discussion in Natural Parents of J.B. seems to be at odds with the legislative 
policy of open court access.  In explaining the constitutionality of closing TPR hearings, the 
court conveys a message that closed proceedings are not only constitutional, but may be in the 
best interest of the child.96 While Florida continues to be known in dependency circles as a very 
open door state, the exceptions that dot its code books and the opinions handed down by its 
courts seem to be telling a very different story.  
2. Oregon 
The state of Oregon provides another example of an open door approach to juvenile 
dependency proceedings.97 Unlike Florida, the key that has unlocked Oregon’s courts was the 
 
95 Id. at 9.  
 
96 Id.  The court hints at its belief that closed proceedings may be in the best interest of the child 
when it states that “the history of the juvenile justice system indicates . . . that it is in the best 
interest of the child to protect the child from publicity in certain proceedings and that this 
protection outweighs the public’s right to access.”  Id.  The court makes no specific mention of 
which types of cases it believes should be presumptively closed.   
 
97 Barbara White Stack, Oregon’s Constitution Unlocks Juvenile Courts, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1. 
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state constitution.98 Though both Florida and Oregon have some form of open court access, the 
path leading to Oregon’s policy is unique. 
a. The Oregon State Constitution and Open Court Access 
Oregon was among the first states in the nation to open its juvenile courts to the public.99 
However, it was a judicial not a legislative decision that opened the courts.  The doors were 
opened by the Oregon Supreme Court case of State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Company v. 
Deiz.100 
In this case, the Oregonian Publishing Company petitioned for a writ of mandamus 
against a circuit court judge after the judge excluded a reporter from a juvenile hearing.101 The 
Oregonian first claimed that the judge abused her discretion by excluding the reporter because 
Oregon law allowed a judge to admit those who have a direct interest in the case or the work of 
the court.102 The court rejected this argument stating that the judge had broad authority to 
 
98 Id. As seen above, Florida has a special statutory provision that opened juvenile dependency 
proceedings to the public.  See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). Though Oregon does not have 
such a specific provision, a general open court statement in the state constitution was used to 
open the doors of dependency courtrooms.  See OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 
99 Stack, supra note 1, at A1.  Oregon juvenile dependency courts were opened to the public in 
1980.  Id.  
100 613 P.2d 23 (Or. 1980).  
 
101 Deiz, 613 P.2d at 25.  The Oregonian newspaper learned and published the identity of a 
thirteen year old girl who was in custody in connection with the drowning death of another child.  
Id.  After a judge barred the press from the courtroom, the Oregonian filed a motion to be 
permitted to attend the hearings.  Id.   The juvenile who was the subject of the case and the media 
stories opposed the motion.  Id.  The defendant judge denied the Oregonian’s motion and barred 
the reporter from the courtroom.  Id.  Though the facts in this case concern a juvenile 
delinquency proceeding, the decision by the Court established open court proceedings for all 
juvenile cases (both delinquency and dependency).   
 
102 Id.  The Oregonian claimed that they had a “‘proper interest’ in the case because it is 
important for the public to be informed about the workings of the juvenile justice system and the 
press informs the public.”  Id. 
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control courtroom access.103 The Oregonian next argued that the application of the statute giving 
the judge discretion to close the courtroom was invalid as contrary to the Oregon Constitution.104 
The Constitutional phrase at issue in this case states, “No court shall be secret, but justice shall 
be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay.”105 
The Oregonian argued that this language should be construed literally and therefore all 
courts should be open to the public.106 The defendant countered that argument claiming that the 
language of the constitution grants the litigant the right to an open trial, but no such right is 
granted to the public.107 The court rejected the defendant’s argument saying that “the sweeping 
language with which the prohibition is written makes it unreasonable to interpret it to be merely 
a grant of a right to an individual.”108 
Also arguing against opening the proceedings of the court was the Attorney General, 
appearing as amicus curiae.109 He argued that the generation that adopted that portion of the 
 
103 Id. at 26. The court found that the media are members of the public and therefore “may be 
excluded when the juvenile court is of the opinion that privacy would promote the goals of 
juvenile justice.”  Id.   
104 Id. See OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 
105 Deiz, 613 P.2d at 26. The court notes that this language was enacted as part of the original 
constitution in 1859 but has not been authoritatively construed.  Id.   
 
106 Id. 
107 Id. Under the defendant’s logic, the Oregon court could close the courtroom if the child 
requested, or did not object.  Id. 
108 Id.  The court also rejected defendant’s further contention that the public has no interest in 
juvenile proceedings because the parents play the role of judicial monitor.  Id. at 27.  The court 
notes that the language in the Oregon Constitution does not distinguish between various types of 
court proceedings; rather, it applies to all.  Id.  
 
109 Id. at 27.  
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Constitution did not intend for the language to be applied literally.110 In support of this 
proposition he points to section 898 of the original Oregon Code of Civil Procedure which 
provided that the court could close proceedings to the public.111 The court responded by saying 
that it was of no consequence that the provisions were enacted around the same time and may 
have been written by some of the same drafters as legislators are concerned with the immediate, 
while constitutional drafters look long-term.112 Accordingly, the court gave deferential weight to 
the words of the constitutional drafters and held that the judge’s order barring the plaintiffs from 
the courtroom was contrary to the Oregon Constitution.113 
In its holding, the court was careful to note that it was not guaranteeing a right of access 
to all aspects of all judicial proceedings.114 The court declared that court conferences and jury 
deliberations were to continue to be held in private in accord with longstanding tradition.115 
Furthermore, the court declined to address the issue of whether certain people may be excluded 
from certain court proceedings.116 The court limited its holding to directing the trial judge to 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 1.040 (2003). 
 
112 Deiz, 613 P.2d at 27.  The court cites as an example the fact that some of the same people 
who drafted the First Amendment to the United States Constitution also drafted the Alien and 
Sedition Acts in an attempt to suppress current political criticism.  Id.  
113 Id.  
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. The court admits that the Constitution does not expressly exclude jury deliberations from 
the prohibition against secret deliberations but notes that the “tradition that such proceedings be 
held in private was so long and so well established in 1859 that the tradition should be read into 
the section.”  Id.   
 
116 Id. The court likewise notes that they will not address whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
may be used to limit access to court proceedings.  Id.   
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permit the media to attend the hearings in question.117 In concluding, the court opined that the 
“public has a right of access co-extensive with the press.”118 Though this decision essentially 
removed all locks from Oregon courtroom doors, the court did make clear that courts retain the 
right to limit access if members of the media or public would interfere with or obstruct the 
proceedings, or overcrowd the courtroom.119 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Howell points to a statute enacted by the Oregon 
legislature that allows for private proceedings “in the interests of justice.”120 He notes that issues 
of paternity in filiation proceedings are to be determined by the court in a private hearing.121 He 
also places great emphasis on the section of the Oregon Code of Civil Procedure which allows 
the court proceeding to be closed upon agreement of the parties.122 Justice Howell stresses the 
fact that this code section was enacted a mere five years after article I, section 10 of the Oregon 
Constitution was adopted.123 He believes that the adoption of this code section was meant as a 
 
117 Id.   
 
118 Id.   
 
119 Id. The court did not indicate what actions will be sufficient for the trial judge to find that 
interference or obstruction has or may occur.  It leaves one to wonder whether the prospect of 
severe emotional harm to the child may be construed as an interference with the proceeding.  
However, because the court does refer to overcrowding, it is likely that they meant this limitation 
to apply to interference with the mechanics of the court proceeding itself rather than the 
emotional status of the parties.  
 
120 State ex rel. Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23, 32 (Or. 1980) (Howell, J., 
dissenting).  
 
121 Id.  Note that filiation proceedings are those conducted by courts to determine paternity.  See 
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.155(1) (2003). 
 
122 OR. REV. STAT. § 1.040 (2003).  
 
123 State ex rel. Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23, 31 (Or. 1980) (Howell, J., 
dissenting). 
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limitation on the general statement about open courts contained in the Constitution.124 As logical 
and compelling as Justice Howell’s arguments may be, they did not command a majority of the 
court.125 Because the majority’s decision stands, the doors of Oregon’s courts were opened to 
the public.126 
b. Oregon Juvenile Courts Welcome You: Unless You are From the Media?  
 After the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Deiz,127 it appears fairly clear that the 
media possesses a right of access to juvenile proceedings in the state.  The court was careful not 
to set many limits on their holding.128 However, since this case was handed down, the current 
Oregon Supreme Court has placed a limitation on the Deiz holding.129 For this limitation, one 
needs to look no further than the Oregon Uniform Trial Court Rules.130 Amended in 1999 by 
consent of the Oregon Supreme Court, Oregon Uniform Trial Court Rule 3.180 provides that 
“public access coverage shall be allowed in any courtroom.”131 This rule appears to be in perfect 
 
124 Id.   
 
125 Id. at 30. 
 
126 Deiz, 613 P.2d at 27. 
 
127 613 P.2d 23 (Or. 1980). 
 
128 Id. at 27. The Court noted, “we do not address the question of whether certain persons can be 
excluded from certain court proceedings.  Id.  
129 OR. U.T. CT. R. 3.180(2). 
 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
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accord with the court’s decision in Deiz.132 However, the rule places a limitation on Deiz as it 
exempts juvenile proceedings.133 
It is important to analyze exactly what the Uniform Trial Court Rule is forbidding.  The 
Rule is not placing a complete restriction on media and public access to juvenile proceedings; 
rather it closes such proceedings only to “public access coverage.”134 The Rule defines public 
access coverage as coverage by means of “television equipment; still photography equipment; 
audio, video, or other electronic recording equipment.”135 It appears that as long as the member 
of the media is not recording the proceeding in any way, they will be allowed access to juvenile 
proceedings.  Though this does not completely bar the media from juvenile dependency 
proceedings, it may have a profound impact on the way that the media covers such stories.  If a 
reporter is not allowed to record the proceeding she will be forced to take notes by hand which 
could result in a less than accurate depiction of more complex court proceedings.136 In addition, 
 
132 Deiz, 613 P.2d at 27. In this case the Oregon Supreme Court allowed a reporter from The 
Oregonian access to a juvenile dependency proceeding.  Id.   
133 OR. U.T. CT. R. 3.180(2)(C).  “There shall be no public access coverage of . . . [d]issolution, 
juvenile, paternity, adoption, custody, visitation, support, mental commitment, trade secrets, and 
abuse, restraining and stalking order proceedings.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 
134 OR. U.T. CT. R. 3.180(2)(C).  If this rule were read as entirely barring the media from juvenile 
court proceedings, it would be in direct opposition to the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding in 
Deiz.  Deiz, 613 P.2d at 27.  This would indeed be an ironic situation as the same court that 
handed down the decision in Deiz is responsible for approving and promulgating the Oregon 
Uniform Trial Court Rules.  Welcome to Oregon Judicial Department, 
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/RULE20.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) (stating that the 
Uniform Trial Court Rules were originally adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court and can only 
be amended with the consent of said court).   
 
135 OR. U.T. CT. R. 3.180(6).   
 
136 If a member of the media is jotting down cursory notes by hand, it is quite possible that they 
will only capture a glimpse of the proceeding.  This may result in a skewed public perception of 
what occurred during a given court proceeding.  However, reporters may argue to the contrary 
that they are skilled at note-taking and the ban on recording devices will in no way hinder their 
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members of the media may be less inclined to cover juvenile proceedings if they cannot 
accurately record the events.  In this way, the rule may be seen to push the doors of Oregon’s 
juvenile dependency proceedings slightly closed. 
c. For Your Eyes Only: Oregon’s Record Confidentiality Provision  
Despite the language in the Oregon Constitution requiring open courts, the records of 
juvenile court proceedings in Oregon are closed to the public.137 The applicable statute states 
that the “[r]ecord of the case shall be withheld from public inspection but is open to inspection 
by the child, ward, youth, youth offender, parent, guardian, court appointed special advocate, 
surrogate or a person allowed to intervene in a proceeding involving the child, ward, youth or 
youth offender, and their attorneys.”138 In addition to case records, reports about the child’s 
history and prognosis are similarly privileged.139 These materials, unless requested by the child, 
cannot be released to anyone other than the judge, and those similarly involved in the case.140 
However, not all information is restricted.  The statute does allow for the release of the basis of 
 
ability to tell a fair and accurate story.  The ease of covering a court proceeding by solely taking 
notes may depend somewhat on the complexity of the issue before the court.  Furthermore, the 
style of the particular judge may affect note-taking.  If the judge is prone to using “legalese” the 
reporter may find herself struggling to jot down all of the details.   
 
137 OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.255(1) (2003).  
 
138 Id.  
 
139 OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.255(2) (2003). This provision affords confidentiality to all reports 
and materials relating to a child’s history and prognosis.  Id.   
140 Id.  
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court jurisdiction over the youth, the name and date of birth of the youth, and the date, time, and 
place of the hearings.141 
The contradiction present in Florida law also exists in Oregon.142 The public, including 
the media, is allowed to attend court proceedings, but cannot access the records of these same 
events.  Theoretically, a person could attend a juvenile dependency hearing, take extensive notes 
and have their own record of the case.143 If records provisions are developed to protect the 
confidentiality of the case and the child’s well-being, why then are the courtrooms open for all to 
see?  Like Florida, the State of Oregon is sending out a mixed message.  On one hand, the state’s 
record provisions seem to indicate a concern for confidentiality, while on the other hand, the 
state’s open access rules turn their backs to such protection.  These mixed signals lead one to 
conclude that Oregon only opened its courts in response to a lawsuit.144 Perhaps, if The 
Oregonian had also sued for access to the records of juvenile proceedings, we might see more 
consistent legislation.  Until such a lawsuit is brought, the State of Oregon will continue to talk 
 
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.255(2) (2003).  This provision allows the public to gain the 
information necessary to attend a court hearing on a certain case, but does not allow access to the 
complete case file.  Id.   
142 See FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.255(1) (2003).  
 
143 In this modern era of extensive internet use, a court attendee could type notes of the 
proceeding and post it directly onto an online journal.  With the surge in popularity of internet 
journals known as “blogs”, posting information on line has become increasingly easier.  In 2004, 
twenty seven percent of American adults reported reading blogs.  CBS News, Popularity of 
‘Blogs’ Surges, Jan. 4, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/04/ 
tech/main664638.shtml.  According to Lee Rainie, Director of the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project, “Awareness of blogs will grow dramatically. There's so much attention to the 
coverage on blogs and Web sites and first-person video as primary news sources."  Id. Under 
current Oregon law, it would be perfectly legal for a person to attend a dependency hearing, take 
notes, and post those notes on the internet for the world to see.   
 
144 See Deiz, 613 P.2d at 25. 
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out of both sides of its mouth; allowing the public to witness court proceedings, but denying 
access to the records of those proceedings. 
d. The Effects of Open Court in Oregon 
Since the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Deiz,145 juvenile dependency proceedings 
have been open to the public.146 What has been the effect of the open access policy? Since the 
doors have been opened, has the public rushed through them?  
According to Oregon Circuit Court Judge Daniel Murphy, public access to juvenile 
proceedings is just “an accepted part of our way of doing things.”147 This relaxed statement 
indicates that the impact of open court access, at least from a judge’s point of view, has been far 
from monumental.  Perhaps the reason why people are not flooding courtrooms is that they are 
not aware that they have a right to be there.  A group of Oregon citizens is working to change 
this.148 Open Oregon claims that in the decades since Oregon’s open access to government laws 
were passed, “public meeting and records laws have faded from public consciousness.”149 They 
 
145 Id. at 27. 
 
146 White-Stack, supra note 97, at A1. 
 
147 Stack, supra note 1, at A1. 
 
148 Open Oregon: A Freedom of Information Coalition, http://www.open-oregon.com (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
 
149 Id. 
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assert that “many citizens don’t know they have a right to open government.”150 Part of Open 
Oregon’s mission is to educate the public on their right to access.151 
While judges and watchdog groups may believe that the public has not had a profound 
impact on dependency proceedings in Oregon, it does not appear that anyone has stopped to ask 
the children how they have been impacted.152 Though the public has not been pouring into 
dependency courtrooms in droves, the presence of a single member of the public or media could 
have a significant effect on a child’s well-being.153 It is not enough to justify open access rules 
on the fact that the public hasn’t swamped courtrooms.  One person, one set of ears, and one set 
of eyes is all it takes to damage a child.154 
As we have seen from analyzing the examples of Florida and Oregon, certain states have 
adopted an open access policy for their juvenile courts.  However, the reality is that the policies 
 
150 Id. Open Oregon deals with a wide range of freedom of information issues, not limited to 
open access to juvenile courts.  Id. However, the group does specifically discuss access to 
juvenile proceedings.  Open Oregon, Access to Juvenile Court, http://www.open-
oregon.com/New_Pages/JuvenileCourtAccess.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).  
 
151 Open Oregon: A Freedom of Information Coalition, http://www.open-oregon.com (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
 
152 As of the date of this writing, it does not appear that there has been a study conducted or 
published documenting the effect of Oregon’s open court policy on the children who are the 
victims of child abuse and neglect and are the subject of dependency proceedings.  
 
153 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.   
 
154 Imagine a scenario in which a child is testifying about sexual abuse and is being asked to 
describe her father’s private parts in great detail (not an usual occurrence in sexual abuse 
proceedings).  If a member of the child’s community is in attendance, the child may be afraid of 
testifying truthfully because of sheer embarrassment or fear of retribution from an angry and 
equally embarrassed parent.  See id.   
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are not as clear cut as advertised.155 Because of the numerous exceptions carved into the rules, 
the public may have to navigate a labyrinth of rules before they can even set foot in the 
courtroom.  Furthermore, because of a serious dearth of information on the effects of open courts 
on the children of dependency hearings, it seems imprudent for states to attempt to thrust open 
their doors. 
B. Keep Out: California’s Closed Court Provision 
In contrast to the states discussed above, California dependency proceedings are 
presumptively closed to the public.156 California Welfare and Institutions Code dictates that:  
“[u]nless requested by a parent or guardian and consented to or requested by the 
minor concerning whom the petition has been filed, the public shall not be 
admitted to a juvenile court hearing.  The judge or referee may nevertheless admit 
such persons as he deems to have a direct and legitimate interest in the particular 
case or the work of the court.”157 
This statute stands in direct contrast to the laws we have seen thus far.  It is fascinating to see 
that states within the same country, charged with the same task of protecting dependent children, 
can take such diverse approaches to remedying the same types of problems.  The following 
section will analyze the development and current state of California policy as well as efforts by 
some Californians to change the rules.158 
155 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 63.162(1) (2005); OR. REV. STAT. §
419A.255(1) (2003).  
 
156 In addition to California, thirty seven states have some form of closed dependency court 
proceedings.  See Barbara White Stack, States That Have Open or Closed Hearings, Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette, Sept. 23, 2001, at A1.  For purposes of this comment, California will be discussed 
as the example of a closed court system because of its impact on the author’s course of study and 
eventual practice of law.  Furthermore, California is notable as there have been recent legislative 
attempts to change the law.  See infra notes 206-32 and accompanying text.  
 
157 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001).  
 
158 See infra notes 159-232 and accompanying text. 
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 a. Development of California Law and Its Current State 
i. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 346 
Before 1976, juvenile dependency and delinquency proceedings were treated as one in 
the same and their confidentiality was governed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 676.159 
In 1976, dependency proceedings in California were separated from delinquency proceedings.160 
Accordingly, California Welfare and Institutions Code was amended to add section 346 
pertaining to the exclusion of the public in dependency proceedings.161 The addition of section 
346 both ensured that dependency proceedings would remain private, and that judges retained 
the discretion to admit persons having a “direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or 
the work of the court.”162 Because this statutory language is rather ambiguous, it was only a 
matter of time before a court was called upon to interpret and define it.163 In 1991, the language 
of the statute was the subject of litigation which pitted a newspaper against the parties in a 
dependency action.164 
ii. Litigating the Language of the Statute 
 
159 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 note (Deering 2001) (Notes of Decisions).  Section 676 was 
the equivalent of section 346, but also applied to delinquency cases.  Id.   
160 Id.  In some counties, such as Los Angeles County, dependency hearings are conducted in a 
completely separate court facility.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text.    
 
161 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001). 
 
162 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 note (Deering 2001) (Notes of Decisions).  The amendment 
provided judges with the same discretion in dependency cases that section 676 provided them in 
delinquency cases.  Id.   
163 San Bernardino County Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 332 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1991).   
 
164 Id.   
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 In San Bernardino County, a dependency petition was filed against the seven minor 
children of Joseph and Sandra S.165 The petition alleged that the parents had locked their 
daughter Rose in a closet for the majority of her ten years.166 When Rose was found by child 
protective authorities, she was lying in her own feces in urine-stained clothing.167 The local 
newspaper, The Sun, began to cover the story and filed a request with the court for access to the 
court records.168 The minors, parents, and the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) all 
opposed access by the newspaper.169 After holding a hearing on the issue, the juvenile court 
denied the Sun’s request for access to court records but granted permission to attend court 
proceedings with certain restrictions.170 
The petitioners, unsatisfied with this ruling, filed a petition for writ of mandate or 
prohibition claiming that the juvenile court “abused its discretion in allowing the Sun to attend 
 
165 Id. at 335. 
 
166 Id. 
 
167 Id.  
 
168 Id. It is unclear from the record of the case whether The Sun also initially asked for access to 
court proceedings or whether the court raised this issue on its own.  Id. at 335 n.2.  The appellate 
court decides that this factual disparity has no bearing on the decision of the case.  Id.   
 
169 Id.  These parties shall be hereinafter referred to as “the petitioners.”  
170 Id. The restrictions kept the Sun from: publishing the names and any likeness, cartoons, or 
photographs of the minors; interviewing any minor without her attorney present; interviewing the 
minors’ caretakers in the presence of the minors; interviewing any mental health professional to 
whom the minors had been referred; and doing any act in the future “which might interfere with 
reunification or have a negative impact upon the providing of reunification services.”  Id.   
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the court proceedings.”171 The Sun also contested the restrictions imposed on it by the juvenile 
court judge claiming them to be unconstitutional.172 
In deciding the case, the appellate court first rejected the petitioners’ contention that 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 346 does not allow a juvenile court to admit members of 
the press to dependency proceedings.173 The court in reaching this conclusion noted that section 
346 was added when dependency proceedings were separated from delinquency proceedings and 
was intended to allow the judge discretion to admit the press.174 Because the judge retains such 
discretion, it cannot be said that the press will never be permitted to attend juvenile dependency 
proceedings.175 
Before handing down a ruling in this case, the court found it necessary to decide whether 
“the press and the public have a constitutional right to attend juvenile dependency 
proceedings.”176 In reaching a conclusion on this issue, the court surveyed past pertinent cases 
 
171 Id.  
 
172 Id.  
 
173 Id.  
 
174 Id. at 336. Specifically, the Court points to the statutory language allowing the judge to admit 
those with a “direct and legitimate interest” in the work of the court.  Id.   
 
175 Id.  In effect, the court is refusing to interpret the statutory language in such a way that would 
impose a complete access barrier to the media.  The court is clear to note that the juvenile court 
judge retains discretion in such matters.  Id.  The extent of the judge’s discretion is another point 
of contention to be analyzed by the court in this case.  
 
176 Id. If the media and the public possessed a constitutional right of access, the appellate court 
and the State of California would have no power to restrict such access.  If the Court had found 
access to such proceedings to be a constitutional right, the entire state of the law in California 
would have been thrown into turmoil as California’s dependency access laws proceed under the 
assumption that the state has the power to restrict dependency courtroom access.  See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001). 
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and the history of juvenile dependency courts in the United States.177 The court noted that 
juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from traditional adversarial proceedings and 
have a long history of closure.178 According to the court, “[h]earings in the juvenile court 
originally were intended to be informal, nonadversarial and private in the belief that this was 
more consistent with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court than were the traditional 
adversarial proceedings employed in the adult criminal court.”179 The court went on to state that, 
“one of the hallmarks of the juvenile justice system has been confidentiality ensured by private 
hearings.”180 This analysis led the court to conclude that the right of access seen in adult 
criminal proceedings “does not extend to juvenile dependency proceedings.”181 
Because the right of access to juvenile dependency hearings is not constitutionally 
protected, courts are permitted to exclude the public and the media in certain instances.  The 
court in this case had to determine whether the juvenile court judge abused his discretion in 
allowing the Sun access to the proceedings.182 After concluding that the juvenile court’s 
decision was based on a misguided belief, the court directed the juvenile court to vacate its order 
 
177 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 336-43.  
 
178 Id. at 338.  Specifically the court said, “because the history of juvenile courts is one of closed 
proceedings, the constitutional right of access does not extend to these proceedings.”  Id.   
 
179 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967)).  
 
180 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 338. 
 
181 Id. at 343.  In support of its assertion that juvenile cases are to be treated differently than adult 
cases, the court points out that the United States Supreme Court has “refused to compel the states 
to afford the juvenile in a delinquency proceeding all of the same rights to which he or she would 
be entitled in the adult criminal setting.”  Id. at 342.   
 
182 Id. at 343.   
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granting the Sun a conditional right of access.183 The juvenile court’s error was its belief that 
allowing the Sun access to the proceedings would provide an avenue by which the court could 
control the press surrounding the case.184 The court declared that the juvenile court was without 
power to “restrict the press’s right to investigate and publish information which it has lawfully 
obtained.”185 The court pointed to the condition imposed by the juvenile court, restricting the 
Sun’s ability to interview participants in the proceedings, as an “egregious interference with the 
freedom of the press.”186 
The court struck the conditions imposed by the juvenile court but left it to that court’s 
discretion whether to admit the media at all.187 The court concluded by offering a non-exclusive 
factors for the juvenile court to consider in determining whether to admit the Sun.188 According 
to the court, juvenile courts should look first to whether admitting the press and the public is in 
 
183 Id. at 343-44.  
 
184 Id. at 344. The juvenile court felt that if the media was not granted any access to the 
proceedings, they would be beyond the scope of the court’s power to sanction the material 
published.  By allowing the Sun to cover the proceedings, the juvenile court incorrectly believed 
that they could control the content of the reports.  Id.   
 
185 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (citing Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. District Court, 430 
U.S. 308 (1977)).   
 
186 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 344. 
 
187 Id. In imposing conditions on the Sun, the juvenile court extended its reach into the forbidden 
arena of freedom of the press.  Id.  However, because access to juvenile dependency proceedings 
is not a constitutional right, the juvenile court may make the determination whether to admit the 
public and the media to the proceedings at all.  Id.  It becomes clear from this opinion that courts 
may not impose unreasonable restraints on the media as conditions to access, but may 
completely restrict access if found to be in the interest of the case and the court.   
 
188 Id. at 345.  
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the best interests of the minors.189 The juvenile court should also take into consideration the 
social values which may be fostered by allowing public and media access.190 Finally, in 
determining which of these interests should take precedent, the court should consider such things 
as the “age of each child, the nature of the allegations, the extent of the present and/or expected 
publicity and its effect, if any, on the children and on family reunification.”191 After considering 
such factors, the court should “allow press access unless there is a reasonable likelihood that 
such access will be harmful to the child’s or children’s best interest.”192 
iii. Putting the law into practice: Who is allowed and when?  
 The basic framework for interpreting California’s access law was set out by the 
California Court of Appeal in San Bernardino.193 While this case provides useful overall 
guidelines, it is important to analyze the way in which California’s dependency courts deal with 
access on a daily basis.  The California Rules of Court govern the procedure of dependency 
courtrooms and prescribe separate rules for juvenile proceedings.194 Though these rules contain 
the same general legal concepts as can be found in the statutes, they differ in that they act as a 
 
189 Id.  The court asserted that determining the best interests of the minors is the “primary 
concern at all times in the juvenile proceeding.”  Id.  
 
190 Id. “[T]he press can assist juvenile courts in becoming more effective instruments of social 
rehabilitation by providing the public with greater knowledge of juvenile court processes, 
procedures, and unmet needs.” Brian W. v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 790-91 (Cal. 1978).    
 
191 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (citing Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 
A.2d 261, 269 (N.J. 1990)).  The court is careful to remind the juvenile court that it must take 
into account the effect on the child first and foremost before addressing other concerns.  Id.  
 
192 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (citing Brian W., 574 P.2d at 792).  The court refers to 
this standard as the “reasonable likelihood” standard.  Id.   
 
193 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345.  
 
194 See Cal. Rules of Court R. 1410. 
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practitioner’s guide by setting out the law with specificity.195 Instead of a general statement on 
court access, such as contained in the statutes,196 the California Rules of Court lay out exactly 
who can be present in a juvenile proceeding.197 Under these rules, access to juvenile hearings is 
limited to the child, parents,198 counsel, social worker, court appointed special advocate, a 
representative of the child’s Indian Tribe, court clerk, court reporter, and a bailiff.199 
These court rules also reflect the California statutory and case law discussed above.200 
According to Rule 1410(e), “the public shall not be admitted to a juvenile court hearing.  The 
court may admit those the court deems to have a direct and legitimate interest in the case, or in 
the work of the court.”201 In addition, the court may admit others to be present if requested by a 
parent or guardian and consented to or requested by the child.202 These rules reflect the message 
 
195 See Id.  
 
196 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001). 
197 Cal. Rules of Court R. 1410(b). 
 
198 The term “parents” includes de facto parents, Indian custodians, and guardians of the child. 
Cal. Rules of Court R. 1410(b)(2).  If the residences of parents or guardians are unknown, or 
they do not reside within the state, adult relatives residing within the county can be admitted.  Id.  
If there are no relatives residing within the county, any adult relatives residing nearest to the 
court may be admitted.  Id.  The references to Indian custodians and tribe representatives are in 
accordance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) which governs dependency 
proceedings in which the minor subject is found to be an Indian child.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1903 
(2001).  
 
199 Id.  This list of persons entitled to be present reflects California’s position that only those with 
a direct interest in the case should be present.  All titles listed either directly affect the operation 
of the courtroom or have a direct interest in the case.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346
(Deering 2001). 
 
200 See supra notes 156-92 and accompanying text. 
201 Cal. Rules of Court R. 1410(e).   
 
202 Id. 
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contained in the statutory codebook and in past case law, but beyond the printed word, how do 
they operate on a daily basis? 
 As seen in the San Bernardino case, the media may petition for access to a dependency 
proceeding by claiming that they have a “direct and legitimate interest in the work of the 
court.”203 This leaves the court substantial discretion in determining whether to admit the media 
and other members of the public unconnected with the case.  It would seem from this language, 
and from the guide provided by the court in San Bernardino, that any citizen could petition for 
access to a dependency hearing.  Theoretically, one could claim an interest in the work of the 
court based on the taxes each citizen pays to fund the court system.204 Whether this argument 
would succeed if placed before a dependency court judge is unclear.  What is clear however is 
that this hypothetical taxpayer could not be admitted to the hearing if his presence was found to 
be in conflict with the child’s best interest.205 The child’s best interest can only be determined on 
a case by case basis with reference to the specific allegations in the case, the past harm suffered 
by the child, and the likelihood of this random taxpayer spreading his newfound knowledge all 
over town.   
 b. Since It Isn’t Broken, Let’s Fix It: Efforts to Change California Law 
 
203 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001); San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345.  
 
204 This argument is premised on the assumption that one possesses an interest in the public 
utilities and services funded by his tax dollars.  Because one cannot trace dollar for dollar where 
his tax money is spent, it appears unlikely that one would knock on the door of the local 
dependency court asking to see what is being done with his hard earned money.  However, 
because all things are possible, the proposition is worth analyzing.  
 
205 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 345.  “First, and foremost, the court’s discretion must be 
directed at determining what is in the best interests of the minors, for that obviously is the 
primary concern at all times in the juvenile proceeding.”  Id.   
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 As a general proposition, things that are different get noticed.  If you walked into class on 
the first day of law school wearing a suit while all the other students were in jeans, you would 
get noticed.  The other students may act quickly to change you by telling you the importance of 
fitting in with the rest of the law school crowd.206 California is the kid in the suit.  California’s 
dependency court access laws differ from other states so they get noticed.207 Because California 
courts and legislators decided to limit access to juvenile courts, legislators have rushed to tell 
them how to improve and how to fit in with the rest of the crowd.208 This section will look at 
efforts to change the law in California.209 
i. California Senate Bill 1391 
In 2000, California Senators Adam Schiff and Richard Polanco introduced a senate bill 
aimed at opening the doors to California’s juvenile dependency courts.210 The bill proposed that 
all dependency hearings be open to the public unless there was a direct motion to close the 
proceedings.211 The motion would only be granted upon a specific finding that opening the 
proceedings would harm the child’s best interest.212 This bill would have changed the 
 
206 The other feasible scenario is that the students would laugh behind your back and wonder 
why you decided to dress as the professor’s twin.  In this day and age, your suit-wearing plight 
may instantly become the subject of frenzied instant messenger conversations.    
 
207 See supra notes 49-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the law in other states. 
 
208 See S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000); A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  
 
209 See infra notes 210-32 and accompanying text. 
 
210 S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000). 
 
211 Id.  
 
212 Id. The bill provided that if the motion for closure was made by a party other than the child 
or child’s attorney, it must be shown that opening the proceedings would seriously harm the 
child’s best interest.  Id. This language imposed a higher burden on non-child parties.  For 
example, if a parent wanted to move to close the proceedings, she would have to meet the higher 
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presumption in California to one of closure and would have placed the burden on the child to 
move to close the proceedings.213 In addition, the bill set a sunset date of January 1, 2006.214 
Until that date, dependency courts were to be opened to the public.215 If, during that time, 
California was notified that its policy was out of compliance with federal confidentiality 
requirements and was in danger of losing its federal funding, the program would be 
discontinued.216 
California never got the opportunity to test this proposed program because the bill was 
not passed.217 The bill survived the test of the state senate but stalled in the assembly.218 Though 
the reason for the bill’s failure was not officially stated, according to the Los Angeles Times, 
“[e]fforts to change the law to allow public access to juvenile dependency hearings failed in 
 
standard of showing that opening the proceedings would seriously harm the child’s best interest.  
This difference in language appears to give some deference to a child’s desire to close the 
proceeding.  
 
213 The bill did include a provision requiring the child’s attorney to notify the child of the right to 
move to close the proceedings.  Id.  However, closure would not be automatic upon the child’s 
motion.  If the child wished the proceedings closed, the burden would fall on the child to prove 
that opening the proceedings would harm his or her best interests.   
 
214 S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000). 
 
215 Id.  
 
216 Id. The legislative process seems to be out of sync in this case.  It would seem prudent to 
have researched whether the program would cause a loss of federal funding before implementing 
it.  Instead, Senator Schiff proposed implementing the program first, and finding out the 
program’s fate later. 
 
217 S.B. 1391 Complete Bill History, Nov. 30, 2000, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-
00/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1391_bill_20001130_history.html. 
 
218 Id.  
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2000 amid heavy opposition from children’s rights groups.”219 Because children’s rights groups 
opposed the bill, it can be inferred that they did not feel that the bill provided sufficient 
protection to the child victims.  This fear was echoed by social workers who worried that 
children may be subject to exploitation under the bill.220 Whatever their motivations, the 
opposition scored a victory in this case as S.B. 1391 is now a distant memory. 
ii. California Assembly Bill 2627 
Though Senate Bill 1391 failed before it ever opened the courtroom doors, open court 
proponents decided to propose a similar bill in the State Assembly.  In 2004, Assemblyman 
Darrell Steinberg proposed California Assembly Bill 2627.221 Though this bill contained very 
similar language to Senate Bill 1391, there were some notable differences.  First, this bill 
proposed the development of a pilot program in no more than three California counties.222 In 
these counties, dependency proceedings would be opened to the public unless a specified motion 
 
219 Stuart Pfeifer, On the Law: Pleading for Less Secrecy in Juvenile Courts, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 5, 
2002, at CA Metro 2.  
 
220 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.  This union of social workers worried that 
children may be intimidated by the presence of the public in the courtroom and may even be at 
risk of pedophiles attending their court proceedings.  Id.   
221 A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  The bill was supported by Michael Nash, presiding judge 
of the Los Angeles County Dependency Court and Dr. David Sanders, the director of the Los 
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. California Newspaper Publishers 
Association Legislative Bulletin, Assembly Committee to Hear Measure That Would Allow 
Access to Dependency Courts, Mar. 29, 2004, http://www.cnpa.com/Leg/GA/legbularchive/03-
04/032904.htm.  Before coming to Los Angeles, Dr. Sanders was involved in developing 
Minnesota’s pilot program to open dependency courtrooms.  Id. 
222 Id.  The counties were to be selected by the California Judicial Council and were to include 
counties that represented a cross section of California counties.  Id. The human resources 
director in the proposed county would have had to agree to participate in the pilot program in 
order for it to be implemented in that county.  Id.    
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for closure was made.223 The judge would only be able to grant the motion for closure on a 
finding that “admitting members of the public would cause harm to the child’s best interest.”224 
Second, this bill would have required the court to admonish all nonparty court attendees to 
refrain from divulging identifying information about the child.225 Third, the bill would have 
permitted the county’s child welfare department to communicate with the media or public 
regarding dependency proceedings.226 This change appears to have been included to quell one of 
the major fears behind S.B. 1391.  When that bill was introduced, social workers feared that the 
media would portray a skewed version of the proceedings and they would not be able to set the 
record straight due to confidentiality restrictions.227 In the words of a union organizing body, 
“[u]nder this bill, social workers would continue to be the scapegoats for Judges’ bad decisions 
 
223 Id.  
 
224 Id. This language is very similar to that seen above in S.B. 1391.  However, this bill would 
not require a showing of “serious” harm to the child’s best interest as was required in some 
instances under S.B. 1391.  See S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000).  A.B. 2627 also included a 
provision requiring the child’s attorney to advise the child of his or her right to move to close the 
proceedings.  A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  The bill provided that if no attorney was 
present with the child, the court was required to advise the child of the right.  Id.  
 
225 Id. Identifying information was defined by this bill to include the child’s name, date of birth, 
address, social security number, telephone number, and similar information.  Id. Anyone found 
to have violated this order of the court would be held in contempt.  Id. This provision pays lip 
service to the notion that children should be protected.  However, it ignores the fact that a child 
may be harmed psychologically by the mere presence of an outsider in the courtroom, not only 
by outsiders spreading identifying information.  While this provision would have provided some 
measure of protection to the child, it stopped well short of total protection.   
 
226 A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004). Presumably, because current law requires closure and 
confidentiality, child welfare departments do not routinely speak with the media and public about 
the cases they deal with daily.   
 
227 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.    
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and would still not be able to defend their positions outside the courtroom.”228 This bill 
attempted to address this concern by allowing the child welfare department to have more open 
communication with the media about dependency cases.229 
Though A.B. 2627 differed from S.B. 1391, it was doomed to meet the same fate.  It was 
passed by an assembly committee, but, on June 22, 2004, it failed to pass in a senate 
committee.230 Reconsideration was granted by the committee but the bill has since stalled in the 
state senate.231 
Because both major efforts to open California’s dependency courtrooms have failed, the 
law mandates that the doors be kept closed.232 For now, California’s child abuse and neglect 
victims can find safe haven before judges in dependency hearings.  At least until a campaign to 
open courtrooms succeeds in California, the children can take comfort in the fact that their tears 
will not be witnessed by the world and their tragic stories will not become headlines in their local 
newspapers.   
V. Impact 
 
228 Id.  The same union, representing California social workers, asked its members to actively 
oppose S.B. 1391.  Id.  The union provided a sample letter for its members to send to their local 
senators and assemblymen.  Id. This letter said in part, “[a]s a social worker, I see families every 
day that would be seriously harmed if their personal life circumstances were displayed in the 
community.”  Id. 
229 A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  This bill did not specify whether individual social 
workers would have been permitted to speak to the media, or rather, the communication was 
required to proceed through an official child welfare department representative.  No definitive 
answer was written into the bill text as it read that the “county department of child welfare” 
could communicate with the media.  Id. 
230 A.B. 2627 Complete Bill History, Nov. 30, 2004, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-
04/bill/asm/ab_2601-2650/ab_2627_bill_20041130_history.html. 
231 Id.  
 
232 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001). 
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 As we have seen, states differ in their approaches to dependency court access and there 
are compelling arguments to be found on both sides of the debate. This section will break down 
the arguments in favor of opening dependency hearings and will show not only that there are 
alternative ways of tackling the concerns raised, but also that the rights of the child victims are 
often forgotten in the rush to open courtroom doors.233 
A. For the Children: Why Opening the Doors Opens the Children Up to Harm 
 The principal argument raised by open court supporters is that closed courtrooms cloak 
the dependency system in secrecy and allow judges, lawyers, and social workers to be shielded 
from public scrutiny.234 Stories of judges snatching children away from desperate parents fuel 
the fire behind this argument.235 Some feel that closed courts allow judges and other court 
officials to act as they please without ever having to answer “tough questions.”236 The general 
premise behind such an argument is that “public scrutiny would force all parties working on the 
child’s behalf to be more accountable for their actions.”237 As one Pennsylvania attorney argued, 
“[t]here is no reason to hide things under a shadow.”238 
233 See infra notes 234-83 and accompanying text. 
 
234 Stack, supra note 1, at A1. 
 
235 Id.  According to this article, “In a secret hearing . . . a Beaver County judge terminated the 
custody rights of a 19-year-old Allegheny County woman so that her baby could be adopted by a 
pharmacist and his wife.”  Id. Though a compelling story at first glance, the article does not 
mention anything about what this young mother may have done to her child in order for the court 
to terminate her parental rights.  Media portrayals such as this give off the impression that judges 
act as baby snatchers taking children from poor parents and passing them off to the waiting arms 
of the wealthy.  However, this ignores the terrible truth behind these stories.  Parental rights 
simply are not terminated under the law unless the child has been subject to abuse or neglect and 
efforts at family reunification have failed.   
 
236 Barbara White Stack, Open Justice: Little Girl’s Murder Brought New York’s Juvenile Court 
Proceedings into the Light, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 24, 2001, at A1.  
 
237 Tucker, supra note 3. 
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 It is not in dispute that the nation’s child welfare systems could benefit from some type of 
reform.239 However, opening the courtroom doors is not the answer.240 When broken down, the 
public scrutiny argument that has carried the open court supporters simply falls apart.  Such 
arguments are full of hyperbole and are designed to strike fear into citizens so that they act 
before they think.241 However, it is crucial that we think before we act.  Before we rush to open 
courtroom doors, we must ask how open courts will bring reform to the child welfare system.  
How does shedding light on a child’s suffering change the system?242 This is the crucial link 
missing in the public scrutiny argument.  Allowing the public and the media to access the system 
does not guarantee that the system will be improved.243 What if the police were to let the public 
 
238 Stack, supra note 1, at A1.  As the following section will show, there are indeed many reasons 
to keep courtroom doors closed.  See infra notes 239-80 and accompanying text.  Open court 
proponents tend to use ominous language to describe closed court systems, but it is important 
that we look past the elaborate semantics and place the focus on the impact that open courtrooms 
may have on the children.  Id. 
239 A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  The bill introduction notes that the juvenile dependency 
and foster care systems in California have not adequately met the needs of children.  Id.  Similar 
arguments are made for states all across the nation.  Tucker, supra note 3.  A social worker union 
organizing committee wrote, “Local 535 child welfare workers could not agree more that the 
child welfare system in Los Angeles is a disaster!” Richard Bermack, Sacrificing Families to 
Reveal the System’s Failings, http://www.rb68.com/Dragon/issue6-3/sb1391-editorial.htm.  
240 Bermack, supra note 239.  Bermack discusses California Senate Bill 1391 and concludes that 
opening courtroom doors would not solve the system’s problems but instead, would further 
victimize the children.  Id. 
241 See Barbara White Stack, Open Justice: Little Girl’s Murder Brought New York’s Juvenile 
Court Proceedings into the Light, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 24, 2001, at A1.  This articles 
uses dramatic imagery of child abuse to incite outrage in the reader.  Id. 
242 Tucker, supra note 3.  The public scrutiny argument is contentious “because those opposed to 
opening the courts maintain that public observation will not actually result in the needed 
reform.”  Id. 
243 Bermack, supra note 239. 
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stop and gawk at a bloody car accident scene?  This would do absolutely nothing to save the 
accident victims, or to clean up the accident site.  Instead it would merely satisfy the public 
hunger for the next sensational story.244 Opening up the courtroom is tantamount to allowing the 
public to view the accident scene.  Nobody is helped, nothing is improved, and the accident 
sufferers risk humiliation. 
 Open court supporters argue that public scrutiny would possibly lead to pressure upon 
child welfare agencies to reform.245 However, they cannot reform without increased funding and 
decreased caseloads.246 Child welfare systems will not be miraculously improved by allowing 
the public to witness the sad stories of the system’s children.247 Professor William W. Patton, a 
closed court proponent, states that “[t]he benefits to the public in opening dependency hearings 
are illusory.”248 Looking at a state that has already implemented open court rules shows that 
 
244 Social workers in favor of closed courts worry that their decisions would be exposed to public 
scrutiny “without the benefit or knowledge of the applicable laws and codes pertinent to the 
matter before the Court.”  The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 
1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.    
245 Tucker, supra note 3.   
 
246 Bermack, supra note 239. 
 
247 Id.  
 
248 William Wesley Patton, Pandora’s Box: Opening Child Protection Cases to the Press and 
Public, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 181, 186 (2000).  Professor Patton argues that allowing the media 
access to dependency proceedings will not educate the public, but rather, will provide a skewed 
and sensationalized look into the dependency system.  Id. at 187.  An example of Professor 
Patton’s fear can be seen in this newspaper excerpt: “Elisa Izquierdo’s mother slammed the 6-
year-old’s head against a concrete wall, causing the child’s brain to swell and press against the 
unyielding walls of her skull.  It was Thanksgiving 1995.  Elisa’s years of torture, starvation and 
humiliation were over.”  Barbara White Stack, Open Justice: Little Girl’s Murder Brought New 
York’s Juvenile Court Proceedings into the Light, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 24, 2001, at A1.  
This is merely one illustration of the media’s flair for the dramatic, and their desire to highlight 
the most gruesome and heart wrenching scenes.  If little Elisa had survived her mother’s abuse, 
she would have endured more suffering as a result of her story being spread to the public.  In this 
sad case, her memory is exploited in a media attempt to grab readers.  
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allowing the public access to hearings does not magically improve the system.249 In Michigan, 
“media scrutiny . . . did not bring a wave of child protection reform” because reform costs money 
and the public was not willing to allow for the increased spending necessary to improve the 
system.250 
In order to implement effective change within our nation’s child welfare systems, we 
must allocate the resources necessary to realize this change.251 Social workers, attorneys, and 
judges cannot function effectively if they are drowning in enormous caseloads.252 “Workers 
have repeatedly testified to legislative bodies and at press conferences that they are unable to 
provide services to clients or fulfill court mandates.”253 Instead of opening courtrooms at the 
expense of the child, we must work to implement large-scale change to improve the quality of 
the nation’s child welfare systems.254 We should not feel compelled to take the drastic and 
potentially damaging step of allowing the public to witness dependency proceedings in order to 
 
249 Esther Wattenberg, Open Hearings Don't Make Children Safer, STAR-TRIBUNE 
(MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL), Feb. 15, 1997, at 23A. 
 
250 Id. 
251 See Bermack, supra note 239. 
 
252 Id.  
 
253 Id.  
 
254 Id.  “[U]nless caseloads are lowered, it is physically impossible for the system to provide the 
legally-required services to safeguard children and families.  Opening the court will do nothing 
to solve this problem; it will just increase the workload of social workers and drive more workers 
out of the system.”  Id. 
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recognize that the system is in need of repair.  “It is not necessary to sacrifice a family’s privacy 
to reveal to the public the failings of the child welfare system.”255 
Another argument in support of opening courtroom doors claims that public confidence 
in the judicial process will be increased if taxpayers can attend dependency court hearings.256 
The claim is that taxpayers have a right to see where their money is being spent and could act to 
change the system if they did not like what they witnessed.257 However, taxpayer access does 
not come without its costs.258 Public scrutiny may cause judges and child welfare officials to 
become preoccupied with protecting themselves politically rather than protecting the children in 
their courtroom.259 Also, the public may gain a skewed perception of the dependency system 
and “will continue to be confused about the judicial processed because the only cases that will 
receive attention are high-profile cases that may represent the exception rather than the rule.”260 
255 Id. This union spoke out against California Senate Bill 1391, which attempted to open 
California courtroom doors.  Id. They said that opening the doors will not address the problems 
underlying the system rather “it will further victimize children and families by subjecting them to 
public scorn and ridicule.”  Id. In the rush to let the public in, we must bear in mind the potential 
damage that open access can have on the children.  “[T]hink of the child who would be forced to 
testify in front of the media knowing his or her classmates could be watching.  Even if the case 
were dismissed . . . irreversible damage would have been done.”  Id. The union also notes that 
dependency courts were intended to be comforting, non-adversarial settings but have become 
adversarial arenas “where cases are decided by legal strategies and technicalities.”  Id.  They 
argue that “[m]edia access will just intensify this problem.”  Id. 
256 Tucker, supra note 3.   
 
257 Id.  
 
258 Id.  
 
259 Id.  It is a fact of life that judges are concerned with maintaining their status and may find that 
their courtroom decisions change depending on who is in the room to witness the proceeding.  If 
a political heavyweight was in attendance, the judge may feel pressure to decide the case based 
on this witness’ wishes rather than on the merits of the case.  This places the children at further 
risk of exploitation and abuse.  See Tucker, supra note 3.  
 
260 Tucker, supra note 3.  
47
So, while taxpayers may feel more comfortable having access to dependency court proceedings, 
their presence may do more harm than good.261 Looking for alternative means of satisfying the 
goal of public scrutiny may be the most prudent course of action. 
 There is an alternative that could be less damaging to the child.  Instead of allowing the 
general public to see the proceedings, oversight bodies made up of child welfare experts could be 
required to monitor dependency courts and provide detailed reports to the public explaining the 
successes and failures of the system.  This way, the child would not have to suffer from the gaze 
of the public, but taxpayers could gain information on the dependency court process. 
The fear underlying the opening of dependency courtrooms doors is that the children will 
suffer harm.  The arguments in favor of opening the courtrooms claim that public scrutiny will 
help the children, but evidence in support of this proposition is scant.262 Children come into the 
dependency system because they have been the victims of abuse or neglect.263 In addition to the 
physical scars, these children bear emotional and psychological scars that will only be 
exacerbated by allowing the public to witness their plight.  Alan Watahara, the president of the 
California Children’s Lobby stated, “These kids have been victimized once; I don’t want them to 
be victimized again.”264 
There are several concrete concerns raised when opening juvenile dependency 
proceedings.  First, child abuse victims may be intimidated by the prospect of public attendees 
 
261 Id. 
262 See supra notes 234-55 and accompanying text.  
 
263 Fields, supra note 11. 
264 Stuart Pfeifer, On the Law: Pleading for Less Secrecy in Juvenile Courts, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 5, 
2002, at CA Metro 2.  Watahara indicates that a complete ban may not be necessary but 
emphasizes that “we have to be very thoughtful about who, how, where and when.”  Id. 
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and may feel compelled to change their stories.265 The issues that children in dependency 
hearings must testify about are very personal and the presence of a non-party attendee may be 
enough to cause the child to recant.  In order to protect child victims, it is imperative that the 
court is able to get to the truth of the allegations and recantation is a common obstacle when 
dealing with young and impressionable children.  Children may be intimidated by the public or 
media presence in the courtroom and may refuse to cooperate in the proceedings and the 
investigation into the alleged abuse.266 If a child is too afraid to cooperate, the court will not 
have sufficient evidence for detainment and may be forced to send the child back to the abusive 
environment.267 Furthermore, “[a]busive parents could intimidate their children not to report 
child abuse with the threat that the family would be ruined by widespread TV coverage.”268 The 
family reputation may be held over a child’s head as a threat and prevent the child from telling 
the truth about the abuse he or she has suffered.269 
Second, in addition to concerns of recantation, the child may suffer psychological harm 
merely by having his or her story shared in public.270 If word of the abuse suffered reached the 
 
265 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.    
266 Id.  
 
267 Id.  
268 Id. 
 
269 Id.  In response to these allegations, open court proponents may argue that children can be 
sufficiently protected by statutory language that provides for closure of the proceedings when 
deemed to be in the child’s best interest.  See, e.g., A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004); S.B. 1391, 
2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000).  However, as this comment will show, such statutory language does not 
fully protect the child.  See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.  
 
270 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.    
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child’s peers this may open the door for teasing and taunting at school and in the community.271 
Personal information shared during the court hearing could be turned into a sword to be used 
against the child.272 Furthermore, the child may feel a sense of shame and embarrassment 
merely knowing that others in the community are aware of the abuse suffered.  This sense of 
shame and possible taunting by peers may have a downward spiral effect causing the child’s 
academic performance to suffer and his or her social development to be stifled.273 
Third, allowing the public into dependency proceedings opens up the possibility that 
child predators and pedophiles could become hearing attendees.274 As we have seen, Florida and 
Oregon allow the public into dependency court hearings, yet their laws contain no provisions 
barring sex offenders from attending.275 Because such laws allow the entire public into the 
courtroom, they do not provide for any type of screening process that may filter out people who 
pose a potential danger to the children inside the courtrooms.276 It is not beyond the realm of 
possibility that pedophiles may attend dependency hearings to gain access to children that they 
wish to molest.277 
271 Id.  
 
272 Id.  Children may be intimidated by “family or friends of a perpetrator who could sit in on the 
court hearings and then use the court information to verbally threaten the child before, during or 
after a hearing.”  Id. 
273 Id.  
 
274 Id.  
275 See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005); OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 
276 The Dragon: Voice of the Union, Child Welfare Alert! What is SB 1391?, Jul. 18, 2000, 
http://www.rb68.com/socialwork/1391alert.htm.    
277 Id. Though it may be argued that courthouse security is tight enough to keep children from 
being abused or harassed, it is what may happen outside the courthouse that is of utmost concern.  
Pedophiles may use their access to dependency court hearings to profile their potential victims.  
50
Finally, dependency courts were developed with the goal of focusing on rehabilitation 
and family reunification.278 Private hearings have been an essential part of the therapeutic 
atmosphere and “have been considered an important tool in the juvenile court system, both in 
terms of eliminating or reducing any stigma which might attach and, more broadly, in assisting 
in the rehabilitative process.”279 By exposing the child to such stigma, open proceedings have 
the potential to interfere with the rehabilitative nature of dependency courts and destroy their 
very purpose.280 
B. The Saving Grace? Statutory “Motion for Closure” Provisions:  
Open court proponents argue that the child can be sufficiently protected from harm as 
long as the open court law contains a provision allowing for closure if in the child’s best 
interests.281 Though such provisions are a step toward child protection, they are certainly not 
guarantees.  In order for the proceedings to be closed, there must be a motion for closure.282 
Stating that such a provision protects the child requires many illogical assumptions.  In my 
opinion, in order for that argument to work we must begin by assuming that the child recognizes 
 
Id. Then, once the child is away from the confines of the courthouse, the pedophiles may 
attempt to harm the child.  Id. Furthermore, because children in dependency proceedings have 
often been sexually abused, pedophiles may find them to be especially enticing targets for further 
abuse. Id. 
278 San Bernardino, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 339.   
 
279 Id. 
280 Id. “[T]here can be little doubt that the embarrassment, emotional trauma and additional stress 
placed on the minor by public proceedings and the publicity engendered by public proceedings 
may well interfere with the rehabilitation and reunification of the family.”  Id. at 340.   
 
281 Tucker, supra note 3.   
 
282 See FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005); A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004).  Though A.B. 2627 
was not passed, it is still relevant as it reflects the common provision in open court laws 
requiring a motion to close the courtroom. 
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the possible harm to his or her interests from open courts.  Though harm may result from public 
access, it is naïve to assume that every child will recognize this harm.  Second, we must assume 
that the child will have the wherewithal to alert his or her attorney of the potential harm.  Third, 
we must assume that the child’s attorney will take the child’s concern seriously and will move in 
court to close the proceedings.  Fourth, we must assume that the dependency court judge will 
also recognize the harm to the child and close the proceedings.  Four unlikely assumptions 
provide too tenuous a base for the argument.  In order for the closure provision to protect 
children, all of the above scenarios must play out perfectly.  Though the statute may allow the 
judge to move sua sponte to close the proceedings, the judge may not make such a motion if she 
does not recognize the potential harm to the child.283 If a child chooses to internalize his or her 
fear of open court proceedings, the judge may never be aware of the need for closure.  This 
possibility means that children may wish the proceedings closed, but because they fail to 
verbalize this desire, the doors of the court are left open.  Placing the burden for closure on the 
child ignores the reality that children may be too afraid to speak up and assert their right to move 
to close the proceedings.  Instead, the burden should be removed from the child and a 
presumption of confidentiality should be adopted.  
VI. Conclusion 
 As the small child enters the courtroom she tries to hide her tears and her burns from the 
newspaper reporters seated in the back row.  The tears begin to flow more steadily as she realizes 
that she is going to have to tell her story to the world.  How will she explain that her mother 
pressed her face against the hot kitchen stove because she missed the bus to school?  Will they 
believe her when she describes how her daddy touched her in her private parts?  All of these 
 
283 See, e.g., S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000) (providing that judges could move to close 
proceedings).   
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fears come rushing to the forefront because she is in a Florida courtroom where the media is 
present.284 If this same scene played out in California, she would not be subject to the same 
scrutiny because California’s dependency courtrooms are presumptively closed to the public.285 
Though closed courtroom policies leave the public and the media out in the cold, they are 
beneficial in that they maintain a protective watch over the children and their emotional needs.286 
In states that have closed court policies, child victims of abuse and neglect can take comfort in 
the fact that their stories will not be broadcast before the world.287 These children are in 
dependency court because their caretakers have failed them and they need the protection of the 
state.288 The state, their only source of protection, should not exacerbate their emotional injuries 
by allowing the public and the media to witness and report on the tears running down their 
cheeks.  
 
284 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2005). 
 
285 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001).  
 
286 See supra notes 240-80 and accompanying text. 
 
287 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (Deering 2001). 
 
288 Fields, supra note 11.  
 
